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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 93 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 03/06/1997 
Where it occurred: Ward 7, Kabul city Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
 
Accident report 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
Both victims had been deminers for six and a half years. They had attended a revision course 
five months before and had last been on leave 46 days before the accident. The ground in the 
working area was described as a "hard" hillside. A photograph was annotated indicating that 
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the accident occurred outside the cleared area and that the marking stones were moved after 
the accident occurred.  
The Investigators determined that the accident occurred when the Assistant Team Leader 
and the Section Leader went to inspect the site of another accident that had occurred the day 
before [believed to be 1st June]. They did this without the permission of the Team Leader, and 
without his being aware of it.  
The Assistant Team Leader stepped on a mine that had been missed by the victim of the 
previous accident. He did not check the area prior to walking on it. The device was identified 
as a PMN (from "found fragments") and the antenna of a VHF radio was reported damaged. 
The Acting Team Leader (covering for the Team Leader while he was on leave) said that the 
victims were not working properly because they went without instruction to examine the 
accident site. 
A deminer witness said that the victims were careless because they did not recheck the 
accident area as they went.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident was caused by lack of proper command and 
control. The victims did not follow the chain of command, and the Acting Team Leader was an 
unqualified person who was unaware of the whereabouts of the victims. The victims did not 
observe correct safety procedures by checking around the accident point before walking on it. 
  
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the Acting Team Leader should be demoted to the 
position of Section Leader immediately and that a "proper chain of command must be 
maintained within all demining teams". They also said that no one should decide to leave their 
post with permission from the Team Leader, and that demining agencies and site offices 
should be more careful in appointing Acting command personnel. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 124 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 250,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Face 
minor Hand 
severe Arm 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
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COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
 
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: amputation of left leg below knee, left hand injury, 
facial lacerations. 
A medic's sketch (reproduced above) showed serious facial injury, left hand and forearm 
lacerations and below knee lacerations to a traumatic amputation above the ankle. The 
medical report did not mention eyes. 
The demining group reported that the victim suffered a below knee amputation of his left leg, 
loss of soft tissue on his left forearm and lacerations on his left hand. His injuries were 
assessed as a 50% disability.  
Compensation of 250,000 Rs (50% disability) was paid to the victim on 6th November 1997. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 125 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 225,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Leg 
minor Neck 
severe Eyes 
severe Hand 
severe Leg 
COMMENT 
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See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
 
Victim No.2's injuries were summarised as: eye injuries, fractures of right hand fingers, 
laceration on neck and both legs. A medic's sketch (reproduced above) showed finger 
fracture, face and neck fragments and abrasions, knee abrasions on both legs, and shin 
lacerations on both legs. 
The demining group reported that the victim suffered injuries to both eyes and fracture of right 
tibia and lacerated wounds to right hand and right thigh – compound fracture to the shaft of 
right tibia.  
His partial loss of vision in both eyes  was assessed as a 55% disability on 18th July 1997. 
The stiffness of four fingers on his right hand was assessed as a 20% disability. 
Compensation of 225,000 Rs was paid to the victim on 24th September 1997.  
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the victims were field supervisors who were inadequately trained and were either ignorant of 
or ignored basic rules. This inadequacy was recognised by the management group. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The victims' injuries were unusually diverse, affecting eyes, hands and the initiating foot. It is 
likely that the pair were very close together and that both victims may have been stooping to 
examine something that Victim No.1 stepped on when the accident occurred.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
 
Related papers 
A letter from the UN MAC said that the demining group must demote the Acting Team Leader 
because he was not qualified. They added that the group must ensure that all Section and 
Assistant Team leaders hold Team Leader qualifications.  
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